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Epicurean Happiness: A Pig's Life?1 
Epicuri de grege porcum 
("A pig from the sty of Epicurus")  
    -- Horace 
 
David Konstan (Brown University) 
 
In this paper, I argue that for Epicurus, the highest form and final end of human happiness arises when 
the body is free from pain and the soul is free from distress; these, moreover, are what Epicurus denotes 
as the static pleasures. The static pleasures may be accompanied by pleasant thoughts and sensations: 
these are what are called the kinetic pleasures. More particularly, the kinetic pleasures of the body are 
not those of replenishment (as is commonly supposed), but consist rather in unalloyed, but also 
unnecessary, pleasures such as sweet smells and delicious tastes; correspondingly, the kinetic pleasures 
of the mind are joy (khara) and good cheer (euphrosunê), which also are in the class of non-necessary 
pleasures. 
  
 
In an epistle addressed to his melancholy friend and fellow poet, Albius Tibullus, Horace wrote: 
Albius, sincere judge of my Satires, what shall I  
Say you're doing in your native country at Pedum? 
Writing something to outdo Cassius of Parma's pieces, 
Or creeping about silently in healthy woodland, 
Thinking of all that belongs to the wise and good?  
You were never just a body, lacking in feelings: 
The gods gave you beauty, wealth, the art of enjoyment. 
What more would a nurse desire for her sweet darling 
Than wisdom, the power to express what he feels,  
With a generous share of kindness, health and fame, 
An elegant mode of life, and no lack of money? 
Beset by hopes and anxieties, indignation and fear, 
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  I am much indebted to Francesco Verde and Phillip Mitsis for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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Treat every day that dawns for you as the last. 
The hour that’s unhoped for will be welcome when it comes. 
When you want to smile then visit me: sleek, and fat  
I'm a hog, well cared-for, one of Epicurus' herd. 
   (trans. A.S. Kline 2003-05, slightly modified)2  
Horace wittily contrasts his own simple contentment with the brooding temperament of Tibullus, 
and recommends that he rid himself of cares by ceasing to worry about death and living in the moment -
- not to concern himself with surpassing Cassius as a poet, nor to brood (Horace's word is curantem) 
about what kind of behavior is worthy (dignum) of a sage or good person. The advice accords well with 
Epicurus' emphasis on pleasure as the goal of life, and his belief that what most upsets human lives is 
the fear of death: rid yourself of that, and you will have all the joy of which human nature is capable -- 
and which, Horace seems to imply, is more or less that of a well-fed and pampered pig. 
 If indeed pleasure is the supreme goal in life, and if pleasure, moreover, is perceived through the 
senses, then it would seem to follow that a pig, or any other sentient animal, is capable of achieving 
perfect happiness: hence Horace's image is strictly appropriate for an Epicurean.3 In Cicero's treatise On 
                                                 
2
  Albi, nostrorum sermonum candide iudex,  
quid nunc te dicam facere in regione Pedana?  
scribere quod Cassi Parmensis opuscula vincat  
an tacitum silvas inter reptare salubris  
curantem quidquid dignum sapiente bonoque est?  
non tu corpus eras sine pectore: di tibi formam,  
di tibi divitias dederunt artemque fruendi.  
quid voveat dulci nutricula maius alumno,  
qui sapere et fari possit quae sentiat et cui  
gratia fama valetudo contingat abunde  
et mundus victus non deficiente crumina?  
inter spem curamque, timores inter et iras  
omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum:  
grata superveniet quae non sperabitur hora.  
me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises,  
cum ridere voles, Epicuri de grege porcum. 
3
  On the idealization of the lowly pig by the skeptic Pyrrho, see Warren 2002: 113-16; as Warren observes (115-
16), “A pig is to be imitated not because it doubts its senses, but because it does not worry about whether a storm 
is bad.”  On pigs in connection with Epicureanism, see the learned account in Warren 2002: 129-49; Warren notes 
(134) that “The Epicurean pig, when used as a positive symbol, recalls only the tranquil state of that animal rather 
than its psychological incapacities.” Warren reproduces (133) a photograph of a bronze pig discovered in the Villa 
of the Papyri in Herculaneum, which contained the library of the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus. 
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Ends (De finibus), the Epicurean Torquatus explains the doctrine of pleasure in just such terms 
(1.11.29): 
We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate good [extremum et ultimum bonorum], 
which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be that to which all other 
things are referred, while it is not itself referred to anything else. This Epicurus locates in 
pleasure [voluptas], which he holds to be the highest good [summum bonum], and pain the 
highest evil [summum malum]. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is 
born, seeks pleasure and delights in it as the highest good, while it avoids pain as the highest evil 
and so far as possible avoids it.  This it does as long as it remains unperverted, its nature itself 
judging honestly and uncorrupted.4 Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument 
or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided.  These things, he thinks, 
are perceived by the senses [sentiri], as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which 
things need be proved by elaborate reasoning: it is enough merely to draw attention [admonere] 
to them.  (trans. based on Harris Rackham, Loeb Library, much modified)5 
Cicero is a prejudiced source when it comes to Epicurean doctrine, but the account of pleasure 
that he places in Torquatus' mouth is broadly faithful to Epicurus' own view -- subject to the important 
proviso that (as we shall see) it is incomplete.6 Thus Diogenes of Oenoanda, a confirmed Epicurean who 
had an entire wall inscribed with the teachings of the school so as to benefit both friend and stranger 
alike, affirms (fr. 32): 
If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into "what is the 
means of happiness? [eudaimonia]" and they wanted to say "the virtues [aretai]" (which would 
actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about 
this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not "what is the means of happiness?" but 
"what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal [to eskhaton] of our nature?", I say both now 
and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure [hêdonê] is the end 
[telos] of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Brunschwig 1986. 
5
 quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet 
esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum 
bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic: omne animal, simul atque natum sit, 
voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a 
se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus 
esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri haec putat, ut calere 
ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel. quorum nihil oportere exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse 
admonere. 
6
  Tsouna 2007: 14 argues that Philodemus was an important source for the account of Epicureanism in the first 
two books of Cicero’s On Ends. 
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people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, 
but the means to the end. (trans. Smith 1993)7 
Similarly, Diogenes Laertius, who is sympathetic to Epicureanism, reports (137-38) that 
Epicurus 
cites as proof that pleasure is the chief good the fact that all animals from the moment of their 
birth are delighted with pleasure and distressed by pain by their natural instincts, without need of 
reason. Therefore also, we, with our own inclinations, flee from pain.... And we choose the 
virtues too on account of pleasure and not for their own sake, just as we take medicine for the 
sake of health.... Epicurus describes virtue as inseparable from pleasure, while everything 
separable from pleasure is expendable. 
Finally, Epicurus himself states in his Letter to Menoeceus (128-29): "And so we say that 
pleasure [hêdonê] is the beginning and end [arkhê kai telos] of living blessedly [tou makariôs zên], for 
we recognize pleasure as the first and innate good, and on the basis of pleasure we make a beginning for 
every choice and avoidance, and we arrive at pleasure by judging every good by means of sensation as 
our measure [hôs kanoni tôi pathei]."8 What is more, there can be no doubt that Epicurus is referring to 
corporeal pleasure -- not of the body as such, of course, since the body apart from the soul can perceive 
nothing at all, but the body in combination with that part of the soul that perceives; as a fragment 
preserved in Plutarch puts it, "The beginning and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; 
even wisdom and culture must be referred to this." And another fragment, preserved by Athenaeus 
(12.546E) and still more notorious, ascribes to Epicurus (in his treatise, On the End or Peri tou telous) 
the statement: "I cannot think what the good is, if I subtract the pleasures of taste, subtract those of sex, 
                                                 
7
  Fr. 32 col. 1.6-col. 3.8: εἰ µέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ µεταξὺ τούτων τε καὶ ἡµῶν piροβεβληµένον ἐpiίσκεψιν εἶχεν "τί τῆς 
εὐδαιµονίας piοιητικόν", ἐβούλοντο δ᾽ οὗτοι τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγειν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐτύνχανεν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἔδει piοιεῖν 
ἢ τούτοις [τοῦθ᾽ ὁ]µ̣ογνωµονοῦν[τας µ]ὴ̣ ἔχειν piράγµα[τα. ἐpi]εὶ δ᾽, ὡς λέγω, τὸ piρόβ[ληµ]α οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, τί 
τ[̣ῆ]ς εὐδαιµονίας piοιητ[ι]κόν, τί δὲ τὸ εὐδαιµονε̣ῖν ἐστιν καὶ οὗ κατὰ τὸ ̣ [ἔ]σχατον ἡ φύσις 56ἡµῶ[ν] ὀ̣ρέγετα̣ι,̣ 
[τ]ὴν µὲν [ἡ]δ̣ονὴν λ̣[έγ]ω ̣καὶ νῦν ̣κ̣αὶ ἀεὶ piᾶσιν Ἕλλησι κ[αὶ] βαρβάροις µέγα ἐνβ̣[ο]ῶν τῆς ἀρίστης δια[γ]ω̣γῆς 
ὑpiάρχειν τέ̣λος, τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς τὰς νῦν ἀκαίρως ὑpiὸ τούτων ἐνοχλουµένας (ἀpiὸ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ piοιητικοῦ χώρας εἰς 
τὴν τοῦ τέλους (µεταφέρονται) τέλος µὲν οὐδαµῶς, piοιητικὰς δὲ τοῦ τέλους εἶναι. On the instrumental nature of 
the virtues in Epicureanism, see also Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus 132; Philodemus On Choices and Avoidances 
(ed. Indelli and Tsouna) XIV 1-14, with Tsouna 2007: 27. 
8
 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγοµεν εἶναι τοῦ µακαρίως ζῆν. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν piρῶτον καὶ 
συγγενικὸν ἔγνωµεν, καὶ ἀpiὸ ταύτης καταρχόµεθα piάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐpiὶ ταύτην καταντῶµεν ὡς 
κανόνι τῷ piάθει piᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. 
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subtract those of sounds, and subtract the pleasant motions that arise from the sight of a beautiful form" 
(cf. Cicero Tusculan Disputations 3.8.42). 
 If these pleasures are all there is to Epicurean happiness, then it would indeed seem that a pig is 
capable of enjoying the highest good, provided -- and this is a significant qualification -- that it can do so 
permanently, something that pigs by and large cannot secure by their own efforts. Still, all that they 
would lack in this case is continuity of their pleasure, for which they depend on a good herdsman; the 
nature of their pleasure is not different from that enjoyed by more self-sufficient human beings.9 
 In Plutarch's essay Gryllus, also entitled "On the Fact that Unreasoning Creatures Employ 
Reason," one of men whom Circe has turned into a pig refuses Odysseus' offer to have him converted 
back to human form, insisting that a pig's life is superior to that of human beings (Circe has given him 
temporarily the gift of speech and comprehension).10 Much of the pig's argument turns on demonstrating 
that his species is more virtuous, and hence happier, than humans, and since virtues were generally 
understood to depend on reason, the pig's claims are plainly paradoxical, like the alternate title of the 
dialogue itself. In the course of his proof that pigs have great self-control or sôphrosunê, however, 
Gryllus (as the pig is called) appeals precisely to the Epicurean distinction among desires or appetites as 
                                                 
9
 Principal Doctrine 18 states that “Pleasure in the flesh is not increased, when once the pain deriving from lack is 
eliminated, but merely varied; the limit of the mind in relation to pleasure is provided by the calculation of those 
very things, and things like them, that cause the mind its greatest fears” (Οὐκ ἐpiαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκί ἡ ἡδονή, 
ἐpiειδὰν ἅpiαξ τὸ κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ µόνον piοικίλλεται. τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ piέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν 
ἡδονήν ἀpiεγέννησεν ἥ τε τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγισις καὶ τῶν ὁµογενῶν τούτοις, ὅσα τούς µεγίστους φόβους 
piαρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ; I take τούτων as the antecedent of ὅσα, and not as referring back to “pleasures” (so Geer 
1964: 62; contra Bailey 1926: 99; Inwood and Gerson 1994: 33): the flesh naturally reaches a state of fulfillment, 
whereas the mind must reflect in order to rid itself of perturbations. Principal Doctrine 20, however, is 
problematic; I translate: “the flesh takes the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and limitless time provides it [i.e., 
pleasure], but the mind makes a calculation of the end and limit of the flesh and, dissolving fears concerning 
eternity, provides a complete life, and no longer lacks anything in respect to limitless time” (Ἡ µὲν σὰρξ ἀpiέλαβε 
τὰ piέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄpiειρα, καὶ ἄpiειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος piαρεσκεύασεν· ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ 
piέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐpiιλογισµὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑpiὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν piαντελῆ βίον piαρεσκεύασεν, 
καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀpiείρου χρὸνου piροσεδεήθηµεν). Surely the flesh (even if sarx here is shorthand for “body plus 
the non-rational part of the soul, which is the seat of perception”) does not have beliefs (as Geer 1964: 62 takes it) 
or make judgments. The idea must be, I think, that the pleasure of physical well-being in and of itself is not 
marked by a sense of limit, and so is wholly satisfying; the mind, however, is aware of the temporal limits of flesh 
and so must achieve a sense of its completeness by banishing fears of death. 
10
 For further discussion of the Gryllus, see Konstan 2011. 
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(1) natural and necessary, (2) natural but not necessary, and (3) neither necessary nor natural but arising 
out of empty or false belief (kenê doxê, 989B-C; cf. Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus 127; Principal 
Doctrine 29).11 Human beings, he alleges, are susceptible to the last kind -- we understand that they are 
capable of having beliefs, and hence false as well as true ones -- whereas "wild animals have souls that 
are wholly inaccessible to and unmixed with extrinsic passions [pathê] and in their lives are remote from 
empty belief" (989C). Of course, if animals are by nature immune to unnatural desires and free of empty 
doxa -- as they are from all belief, whether true or false -- then they have no need of sôphrosunê, the 
object of which is to govern such appetites. But if Gryllus' position is wittily illogical in regard to 
virtues, which were central to the good life in Stoicism and other ancient schools, he may still have a 
case that his is the best life on Epicurus' view, in which the natural pleasures are indeed represented as 
the highest objective in life. Here again, Epicurean happiness would seem to be something that a pig can 
lay claim to enjoying. 
 There is, however, a flaw in Gryllus' position, and this apart from his acknowledged dependency 
on Circe's tendance of her metamorphosed herds (and hence his insufficiency to secure his own 
happiness). The Epicurean definition of the highest good is not in fact reducible to the enjoyment of 
pleasures, however natural. Lucretius, for example, exclaims in the proem to the second book of his 
poem, De rerum natura, Lucretius: 
O minds of mortals, blighted by your blindness!  Amid what 
deep darkness and daunting dangers life's little day is passed!  To think that you should fail to 
see that nature importunately demands [latrare] only that the body may be rid of pain, and that 
the mind [mens], divorced from anxiety and fear, may enjoy agreeable sensation [iucundus 
sensus]! (trans. Smith 2001: 35–36, modified)12 
                                                 
11
 Erroneous beliefs are referred to as hupoleipseis in Letter to Menoeceus 124, in connection with popular 
conceptions of the gods; these clearly cannot be ascribed to animals. On such “suppositions,” see Verde 2010: 
126-28. 
12
 o miseras hominum mentis, o pectora caeca! 
qualibus in tenebris vitae quantisque periclis 
degitur hoc aevi quodcumquest! nonne videre 
nil aliud sibi naturam latrare nisi utqui 
corpore seiunctus dolor absit, mente fruatur 
iucundo sensu cura semota metuque? (2.14–19) 
7 
 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. VI 2012 Issue 1 
 
 
 
What nature -- human nature, presumably, but also the natural order of things -- howls out for is 
in the first instance an absence, that is, freedom both from physical pain and mental anguish. The word 
latrare refers literally to the barking of dogs, and Lucretius no doubt employs it here not just to indicate 
an emphatic appeal, as Martin Ferguson Smith renders it, but the claim of nature at the most basic 
animal level. A further benefit of the lack of physical and mental misery is the ability to enjoy pleasant 
sensations. Lucretius faithfully reflects Epicurus' own conception; as he writes in his Letter to 
Menoeceus (128), just before the passage from this same epistle cited above: 
an unerring theory of the desires knows to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the 
body and the inperturbability [ataraxia] of the soul, since this is the goal [telos] of living 
blessedly.  We do everything for the sake of this, so that we may neither be in pain [algômen] 
nor tremble fearfully [tarbômen]. Once this is the case for us, the entire storm of the soul is 
dissipated; since the animal [to zôon] cannot proceed as though to something it needs and seek 
something else by which the good of the soul and body will be fulfilled [sumplêrôsetai]. For it is 
then that we have need of pleasure, when we are in pain because pleasure is not present: when 
we are not in pain, we no longer need pleasure. 
If the goal of life is liberation both from bodily pain and from mental or psychological anxiety, 
then animals will only be able to enjoy this highest good if they know both kinds of freedom. Now, we 
have seen that animals are not capable of entertaining false beliefs, inasmuch as they do not have beliefs 
at all: that is, they are capable of perception, but not reason in the full sense of logos. Epicurus regarded 
the human soul as having two parts: thus, a scholium that has found its way into the text of Diogenes 
Laertius (10.66 = fr. 311 Usener) reports: "He says elsewhere that it [the soul] is made up of very 
smooth and round atoms, which differ greatly from those of fire; and one part of it is non-rational 
[alogon], and dispersed throughout the rest of the body; but the rational part [to logikon] is in the chest 
[thôrax], as is evident from fears [phoboi] and from joy [khara]."13 This account corresponds perfectly 
to what Lucretius tells us (3.136–51, trans. Long and Sedley 1987 vol. 1: 66–67; Latin words inserted by 
me): 
My next point is that the mind [animus] and the spirit [anima] are firmly interlinked and 
constitute a single nature, but that the deliberative element [consilium] which we call the mind 
                                                 
13
 It may be, as some have argued, that at the time he composed the Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus had not yet 
thought of the soul as divided, and that the scholium represents a later revision of his view (there is a textual 
difficulty here as well, involving the reading ti meros, proposed in 1877, vs. the mss. to meros). For full 
discussion, with bibliography, see Verde 2010: 193-96; also Repici 2008. 
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[animum mentemque] is, as it were, the chief, and holds sway throughout the body.  It is firmly 
located in the central part of the chest.  For that is where fear and dread [pavor ac metus] leap up, 
and where joys [laetitiae] caress us: therefore it is where the mind [mens animusque] is. The 
remaining part of the spirit [anima], which is distributed throughout the body, obeys the mind 
[mens] and moves at its beck and call.  The mind by itself possesses its own understanding and 
its own joys [sibi gaudet] while nothing is affecting either the spirit [anima] or the body. And 
just as, when our head or eye is hurt [laeditur] by an attack of pain [dolor], the agony is not 
shared [non ... concruciamur] by our whole body, so too the mind [animus] sometimes itself 
suffers pain [laeditur] or waxes with joy [laetitia] while the rest of the spirit [anima] throughout 
the limbs and frame is receiving no new stimulus. 
The Epicurean Hermarchus is quoted (by Porphyry in his treatise On Abstention from Eating 
Meat, 1.12) as stating that justice does not obtain between human beings and animals because the 
animals lack reason or logos (cf. Epicurus Principal Doctrine 32: "For those animals that were unable to 
form pacts not to harm one another or be harmed, there existed neither justness nor injustice"; Warren 
2002: 138–40). Polystratus, in turn, who succeeded Hermarchus as the third head of the Garden 
(Diogenes Laertius 10.25), denied to animals even the possibility of remembering or anticipating events, 
including their own past and future states of pleasure and pain (coll. I–VII = Indelli 1978: 109–11; cf. 
Warren 2002: 137–38).14 
 The Epicurean account of animal consciousness is thus even more reductive, in this sense, than 
that of other schools, such as the Peripatetic (they were more alike in this respect to the Stoics).  
Aristotle allowed that animals possess "similarities to intelligent understanding (τῆς piερὶ τὴν διάνοιαν 
συνέσεως … ὁµοιότητες, History of Animals 8.588a23–24), and granted animals, if not logos (this is 
reserved for human beings, Politics 1332b5–6), at least a fairly high degree of practical intelligence or 
phronêsis, and also (though not quite consistently) memory: "the more intelligent [sunetôtera] ones, 
which have a share in memory, tend their offspring longer and more sociably [politikôteron]" (History 
of Animals 8, 589a1–2). At Politics 1253a9–15, however, Aristotle states that "among animals, only the 
                                                 
14
 Principal Doctrine 32 might seem to contradict the proposition that animals are not rational: “Toward those 
animals that are incapable of making agreements as to not harming one another or being harmed there is neither 
justice nor injustice, and similarly for those peoples who are either unable or unwilling to make agreements 
concerning not harming or being harmed.” But the argument is, I think, that just as we cannot make agreements 
with (non-human) animals, so too we cannot make them with certain groups of human beings, and hence there is 
no relation of justice with them (cf. Bailey 1926: 269). It is not a statement that some non-human animals can 
enter into agreements.   
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human being possesses reason. Voicing is a sign of what is painful and pleasant, which is why it pertains 
also to other animals (their nature reaches the level of having the perception [αἴσθησις] of what is 
painful and pleasurable and signaling it to one another), but speech [λόγος] is for manifesting what is 
advantageous and harmful, and so too what is just and unjust". As a result, only human beings can 
experience happiness (Parts of Animals 656a5).15 
 A question poses itself: if animals do not have memory or the ability to imagine the future, 
according to Epicureans, how is it that they experience fear, for example, which  would seem to depend 
on the awareness that certain things, for example predators, can cause them harm? Lucretius provides, I 
believe, an indication of how it might work, in his explanation -- in materialist terms, to be sure -- of 
why it is that lions cannot bear the sight of roosters, but instantly take to flight (for this rather odd 
notion, cf. Pliny Natural History 8.52, Achilles Tatius 2.21, Aelian On the Nature of Animals 3.31): 
It is no wonder, since in the body of roosters there are certain constituents, which when they are 
introduced into the eyes of lions, dig into their pupils and produce a sharp pain [dolor], so that, 
fierce as they are, they cannot withstand it, although these [constituents] cannot harm our eyes, 
either because they do not penetrate them or because, though they do penetrate, they are given 
free passage out of our eyes, so that they cannot harm our eyes in any direction by remaining 
trapped inside. (4.714-21) 
The lion flees roosters because the sight of them produces pain; their simulacra are shaped in 
such a way as to sting the eyes of lions, though they do not have this effect on human beings. Lions do 
not believe that roosters pose a threat to them, and so, strictly speaking, they do not fear them, insofar as 
fear requires an anticipation of a future harm (cf. Aristotle Rhetoric 2.5, 1382a21-25; discussion in 
Konstan 2006: 129-55). Their behavior does not depend on reason or on memory, and we may suppose 
that this mechanism applies as well to the natural or instinctive avoidance of harm on the part of animals 
in general. 
 Let us return to the matter of pleasure and pain. The Epicureans maintain, according to Diogenes 
Laertius (10.34), that "there are two experiences [or affections: pathê, plural of pathos], pleasure 
[hêdonê] and pain [algêdôn], which exist in every animal, the one pertaining to what is one's own 
                                                 
15
  On animals and reason in classical thought, see especially Sorabji 1993, who argues that Aristotle and the 
Stoics ascribed a considerably sophisticated role to perception, which substituted for fully human reason or logos; 
also Newmyer 2006: 10-47. 
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[oikeion], the other pertaining to what is foreign [allotrion], by which choices and avoidances are 
distinguished." In this sense, pleasure is the universal goal of sentient creatures, that is, creatures capable 
of perception or aisthêsis. However, as we have observed, if for animals it is sufficient for their well-
being simply to be rid of pain and to enjoy pleasure, for human beings this is not sufficient: we also 
require a mind free from perturbation. These two conditions, taken together, constitute the basis of 
human happiness. Each part of the soul, the non-rational or alogon part (in Lucretius' terminology, the 
anima) and the rational or logikon part, is capable independently of experiencing pain of the kind that 
specifically affects it. 
 Let us cite once more Lucretius' words: "The mind by itself possesses its own understanding and 
its own joys [sibi gaudet] while nothing is affecting either the spirit [anima] or the body.  And just as, 
when our head or eye is hurt [laeditur] by an attack of pain [dolor], the agony is not shared [non ... 
concruciamur] by our whole body, so too the mind [animus] sometimes itself suffers pain [laeditur] or 
waxes with joy [laetitia] while the rest of the spirit [anima] throughout the limbs and frame is receiving 
no new stimulus." The pain of the mind consists in fear and similar psychological perturbations (we 
shall consider shortly the nature of the opposite or positive state of khara or laetitia). An animal may 
suffer pain in one part of its body and not another, just like us; but we have a part that animals do not, 
namely the rational portion of the soul; a pig, for example, can no more feel pain or pleasure in this area 
of the psyche than human beings can feel pain in their tails, and for the same reason: we do not have 
tails any more than pigs have a logikon part of their souls. 
 Still, there is a difference between the two cases: the pain that pigs or we feel in one or another 
part of our body, and which of course involves the non-rational part of the soul as well (dead bodies feel 
no pain), is the same in kind, no matter what part is affected: it is called dolor or algêdôn, terms that 
refer specifically to physical pain. The discomfort of the rational soul, however, is of another kind: it 
consists in being in a fearful or anxious state (cf. Epicurus' term tarbômen, and Lucretius' cura), and this 
depends on entertaining certain kinds of beliefs -- false ones, as it happens -- concerning the nature of 
death and other things we wrongly regard as harmful. Human beings require that both the non-rational 
and the rational parts of the soul be free of their respective types of trouble. What is more, the 
perturbations of the mind carry with them severe consequences for human life, in that people, in a vain 
11 
 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. VI 2012 Issue 1 
 
 
 
attempt to avoid death, which they mistakenly perceive as an evil, are driven to seek unlimited wealth 
and power, as though these could keep death at bay and thus allay their anxiety. These desires, which go 
beyond the fulfillment of any and all natural needs, are the cause of the competition and conflict that 
beset society and make life a hell on earth (for discussion, see Konstan 2008). 
 It is now time to consider more closely what the pains of the body and the soul are like.  We have 
already cited Epicurus' view that "we have need of pleasure when we are in pain because pleasure is not 
present: when we are not in pain, we no longer need pleasure." This rather telegraphic statement 
involves a doctrine concerning the nature of pleasure that invited considerable criticism in antiquity and 
has been the source of confusion and debate ever since, namely that pleasure, or at least the highest type 
of pleasure, which Epicurus labeled "static" or "catastematic," consists precisely in the absence of pain 
and nothing else.16 Epicurus also recognized a kinetic or mobile kind of pleasure. Thus, according to 
Diogenes Laertius (10.136 = fr. 2 Usener) Epicurus stated in his book On Choices (Peri haireseôn) that 
"ataraxy and freedom from trouble [aponia] are catastematic pleasures [hêdonai]; but khara and good 
cheer [euphrosunê] are regarded as kinetic activities" (reading κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνέργειαι [nom. pl.] with 
Long and Sedley 1987 vol. 2: 124–25; the mss. give κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ [dative sing.], "kinetic by 
virtue of activity").17 
 Boris Nikolsky begins his important article on Epicurean pleasure with the words: "Practically 
every modern survey of the Epicurean conception of pleasure begins by saying that Epicurus' concept of 
pleasure was twofold: in the opinion of researchers, Epicurus distinguished two kinds of pleasure -- a 
'static' pleasure or a pleasure 'in a state of rest' and a 'kinetic' pleasure or a pleasure 'in motion.'"18  
Unfortunately, most the evidence for the nature of this distinction is late -- Cicero is the chief source -- 
                                                 
16
 For the background to the idea of an intermediate state between pleasure and pain in Speusippus, Eudoxus, and 
Aristotle, see Warren 2009. 
17
 Wolfsdorf 2009: 223-37 shows convincingly that euphrosunê might naturally be applied to the good cheer 
arising from bodily pleasures, and that it was so intended by Epicurus; on khara, see Ramelli and Konstan 2010 
(Maso 2008: 220 mistakenly takes khara to represent corporeal kinetic pleasure, and euphrosunê that of the 
mind). Purinton 1991: 287 denies that khara is a pleasure of any kind, and understands it rather as “the intentional 
state which has pleasure as its intentional object”. I am not persuaded that Epicurus took account of such 
intentional states. 
18
 Nikolsky 2001: 440. 
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and not entirely perspicuous. Thus, Torquatus, in the dialogue On Ends (1.37), explains that mobile 
pleasure "moves our nature by a kind of gentleness and is perceived by the senses with a kind of 
pleasantness (suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus), 
whereas static pleasure "is perceived when all pain is removed" (percipitur omni dolore detracto).  As 
Nikolsky remarks (p. 441): "Here Torquatus draws a distinction between two different states to either of 
which, in his opinion, the notion of pleasure can be applied -- firstly, a state presupposing active 
stimulation of pleasant sensations and, secondly, a state negatively defined as the absence of pain and 
suffering." Cicero further explains, in his response to Torquatus, that "when thirst is quenched it 
produces a stability of pleasure, he claims, but the pleasure, in turn, of the quenching itself is in motion" 
(On Ends 2.9: restincta sitis stabilitatem voluptatis habet, inquit, illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis 
in motu est). 
 Some scholars, including Nikolsky, have sought to impugn Cicero's testimony, pointing to 
inconsistencies in Cicero's own statements and between his affirmations and other, independent 
evidence.19 These scholars have sought to show that the two ostensibly different kinds of pleasure are in 
fact one and the same, or at all events that the distinction, such as it is, does not entail the view, which 
Cicero was pleased to ridicule, that pleasure resides simply in the absence of pain; as Cicero puts it (On 
Ends 2.6): "either Epicurus, or else all other human beings anywhere in the world, do not know what 
pleasure is..., since everyone knows that pleasure is that which perception receives and is moved by and 
is then suffused with a kind of pleasantness" (aut Epicurus, quid sit voluptas, aut omnes mortales, qui 
ubicumque sunt, nesciunt ... quia voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes, quam sensus accipiens movetur 
et iucunditate quadam perfunditur).20 
                                                 
19
 Cf. Gosling and Taylor 1982: 365-396; also Cooper 1998: 512, who argues that the distinction between static 
and kinetic pleasures depends on the objects, and is not “a distinction of kind” between the two types of pleasure; 
for a critique of Nikolsky and of Gosling and Taylor on this score, see Wolfsdorf 2009: 243-53.  See also Erler 
and Schofield 1999: 655, who argue that Cicero’s testimony concerning the quenching of thirst (On Ends 2.9, 
quoted above) “is an isolated text whose interpretation is fiercely contested.  It is not easy to reconcile with other 
evidence, including the explanation of kinetic pleasure as variation Cicero goes on at once to give”; Erler and 
Schofield suggest that “Perhaps Epicurus himself never indicated how he would classify pleasures of restoration 
of the body’s natural state.” 
20
 As Francesco Verde reminds me, Cicero’s statement may be evidence of an evolution of the Epicurean doctrine 
of pleasure by his time. 
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 There is, however, sufficient testimony that, for Epicurus, static pleasure consists in the absence 
of pain or perturbation, whether in the body or the mind; as Epicurus puts it (Principal Doctrine 3), "The 
limit of the magnitude of pleasures is the removal of all that causes pain, and wherever there is pleasure, 
for as long as it is there, there does not exist that which causes pain or distress or the two combined."  
Far from regarding the idea is incoherent or absurd, I believe that it reflects an important aspect of 
Epicurus' philosophy, namely that human beings (and indeed animals too, in their more limited way) are 
naturally in a state of pleasure when they are healthy and free of cares; our natures are thus perfectly 
suited to attaining the goal of pleasure, by the simple means of eliminating the sources of pain. This is 
not, of course, always easy or possible, but given that our physical needs are, according to Epicurus, 
relatively limited, and that most of the psychological perturbations that afflict us depend on empty or 
erroneous beliefs and can be eradicated entirely (there do exist rational fears, of course, and while these 
can be managed they are potential sources of distress), human beings are well adapted to achieving what 
for Epicurus is the goal of life. 
 How, then, does Epicurus understand the pleasure that consists in the mere absence of pain or 
perturbation, and what has this to do with the distinction between static and mobile pleasures? When I 
wrote my book on Epicurean psychology (most recent edition published in 2008), I held the 
conventional view, criticized by Cicero but plausible on the surface, that "kinetic pleasures are those 
associated with fulfilling any kind of need, and above all a natural one like eating" (Konstan 2008: 14 n. 
19). Thus, static pleasure consists in the satiated state of the body when one has finished eating, that is, 
when one has supplied the deficiency that is perceived as the painful sensation of hunger, whereas the 
process of eating -- clearly a kind of activity or motion -- is the source of kinetic pleasure.21 I have come 
                                                 
21
 The view, that is, of Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman Torquatus in On Ends 2.9-10, cited above.  Cf. Rosenbaum 
1990: 24: "The difference between kinetic and katastematic pleasure seems to be that between the pleasure of the 
activity of satisfying desires, wants, or urges, and the pleasure of being in a state of having satisfied one's desires, 
or perhaps as appropriately, being in a state of not having (certain types of) desires or urges"; Held 2007: 18: 
“Kinetische Lust ist ein Prozess der Schmerzaufhebung, der durch die Zufuhr von Lust Mangel beseitigt und ist 
damit graduierbar und quantifizierbar.” Held argues (32-33, 53) that kinetic and static pleasures must be different 
in kind, since static pleasure is the state (Zustand) that is reached when the process of eliminating pain comes to 
an end (contrast Hossenfelder 2006: 72, who affirms “dass es nur eine Lust und nicht mehrere Arten gibt”).  
O’Keefe 2010: 119-20 offers two sources of kinetic pleasure (I agree with the first of these): “‘Kinetic’ pleasures, 
as the name suggests, involve movement. Bodily kinetic pleasures are associated with some sort of active 
titillation of the senses, for example the savoury, greasy taste of a sausage slathered with mustard as it caresses 
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now to believe that this account is wrong, while at the same time I hold that there is in fact a distinction 
between static and mobile pleasure in Epicurean doctrine. The incorrect interpretation, to which I was 
party, has its origin, as Nikolsky shows in the above-cited article, in the traditional view of pleasure and 
pain, which was analyzed most penetratingly by Plato and became the basis of the Cyrenaic theory of 
pleasure, which Epicurus rejected. On this view, as Plato noted, pain and pleasure are not strictly 
speaking opposites: for pain consists in a lack, whereas pleasure consists in the filling of the lack.  Pain 
is thus a state, whereas pleasure is a process, and ordinary language is wrong in regarding them as 
contraries. What is more, Plato observed that, so understood, pain and pleasure necessarily co-exist, 
since one must be at least partially hungry -- in a state of lack -- to enjoy the process of replenishment.  
Plato regarded such pleasure, accordingly, as impure or mixed.  Such were the difficulties that beset the 
conventional view, as Plato saw it, at all events when he was writing the Gorgias: thus, at 496C-E, peinê 
and dipsê are described as aniaron or painful, whereas eating and drinking are a plêrôsis or filling and 
hence pleasurable.22 
 The Cyrenaics, who were followers of Aristippus, a disciple of Socrates, evidently adopted 
Plato's view of pleasure wholesale. Pleasure, they maintained, consists precisely in restocking the 
depleted resources of the body, which is far more capable of enjoyment than the mind; hence, one 
should cultivate desires with the purpose of satisfying them and thus experiencing the greatest quantity 
of pleasure possible (Diogenes Laertius 2.86-90, where the Cyrenaic view that all pleasure is kinetic is 
contrasted with the Epicurean conception). Epicurus, however, took a different line: he affirmed that 
pleasure really is the opposite of pain, and that inasmuch as pain resides in a deficiency or lack, pleasure 
                                                                                                                                                                         
my tongue.  They also seem to be associated with the process of satisfying some desire. For example, I am 
hungry, and this hunger is painful.  But then, as I chew the sausage and swallow it, I am in the process of 
satisfying my desire for food and replenishing myself, and this process would be a bodily kinetic pleasure.” So 
too Morel 2009: 196 describes “les plaisirs ‘en mouvement’ ou ‘cinétiques,’ comme le plaisir de boire quand on a 
soif, ou encore la joie ou la gaieté qui succèdent aux moments de craintes ou l’angoisses,” and he speaks also of 
“un plaisir de soulagement, de réplétion ou de compensation – ce qu’est le plaisir cinétique.” Morel’s suggestion 
that the kinetic pleasures of the mind consist in the process of alleviating anxiety is interesting; however, I offer a 
different explanation of khara below. On pleasures of replenishment, see also Long and Sedley 1987 vol. 1: 123; 
contra Wolfsdorf 2009: 249. 
22
 Plato may have modified this view in the Philebus, where he identified what is painful rather as a dissolution 
(lusis) or corruption (phthora), as opposed to pleasure, which is a filling up (31E-32A); here, then, pain and 
pleasure are both processes, and hence contraries. 
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consists in a state of sufficiency: both are in this sense static, and neither is a process.  What, then, of the 
pleasure associated with eating, drinking, and the like, which is experienced before the hunger or thirst 
is satiated?  The answer, I now believe, is that this pleasure derives from the partially replenished state 
of the organ in question. If we suppose, for a moment, that hunger is caused by an emptiness of the 
stomach, then when one has eaten some food, albeit not enough to fill the void, the stomach is in part 
full, in part empty: the part that is full, and hence not in need, is the source of the pleasure that consists 
in stable well-being, while the part that is still vacant is the cause of pain. The two pathê are indeed 
experienced simultaneously, and in this sense the pleasure is not pure or uniform, but is accompanied by 
pain. As Lucretius, in the passage quoted above, says, "when our head or eye is hurt by an attack of pain, 
the agony is not shared [non ... concruciamur] by our whole body," or, more literally, "we are not racked 
with pain in our whole body," which presumably experiences the pleasure consisting in the stable or 
healthy state that is not affected by pain; so too, when a particular organ is partly in pain due to a 
deficiency, the rest of it is not lacking and so enjoys what Epicurus labeled catastematic pleasure.  As 
one satisfies the need, moreover, the pleasure increases until the source of pain has been entirely 
eliminated and the part affected is wholly sound.  The pleasure does not dwindle to zero over the course 
of this process, but steadily increases until all pain is absent.23  It is true that, in the Letter to Menoeceus 
(131), Epicurus notes that "bread and water render the highest pleasure, when one who is in need 
[endeôn] is offered them." But Epicurus' point here is not that the pleasure increases with the need, but 
that the simplest and most available foods can provide as much pleasure as the most elaborate and 
expensive; of course, there is no gain in pleasure from eating if one is already full.24  In these activities, 
then, there is no place for kinetic pleasure. 
                                                 
23
 For a detailed and, to my mind, convincing defense of the view that “Epicurus does not recognize restorative 
pleasures” (p. 252), see Wolfsdorf 2009; Wolfsdorf connects the Epicurean view with Aristotle’s notion of 
“secondary actuality” (p. 257). 
24
 This is not to say that Epicurus was hostile to luxurious pleasures as such; he opposed them only insofar as they 
are taken to be necessary for happiness. See Woolf 2009 for the argument that, according to Epicurus, “equipped 
with the belief that little will always suffice, we should indeed choose plenty where available” (p. 162). To the 
passages cited by Woolf, we may add Lucretius 2.20-36, which affirms that nature does not require elaborate 
entertainments, but does not reject them per se, except insofar as the effort to acquire the resources needed to 
supply them drives people to strive for wealth and power. Giannantoni 1984: 44 argues that kinetic pleasure is the 
“soddisfazione di desideri naturali ma non necessari,” whereas kinetic pleasure is derives from the satisfaction of 
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 What, then, is the nature of this latter, mobile kind of pleasure?  This, I believe, is the "agreeable 
sensation [iucundus sensus]" that we are free to enjoy, as Lucretius put it, when the body is liberated 
from pain and the mind from anxious fears.25 This pleasure is over and above that which consists in the 
healthy state of body and mind represented by the absence of pain and perturbation; it involves such 
unnecessary but harmless pleasures such as the enjoyment of pleasant odors, tastes or sounds, for 
instance music. These pleasures have no corresponding lack: they are pure surplus, but not for that 
reason problematic. Still, they are lesser pleasures, which we can take or leave without reducing the state 
of perfect contentment that derives from the well-being of body and mind. It is these pleasures that 
Epicurus refers to, I believe, when he declares that when we have achieved a state of pleasure it cannot 
be increased but only varied: "Pleasure in the flesh is not increased, when once the pain deriving from 
the lack is eliminated, but it is only varied" (Principal Doctrine 18, cited more fully above). 
 If the kinetic pleasures of the body consist in such unalloyed, but also unnecessary, things as 
sweet smells and delicious tastes, what of the kinetic pleasures of the mind? Here, as we have seen, we 
are fortunate to have a clear statement, in the form of a quotation from Epicurus' On Choices: "ataraxy 
and freedom from trouble [aponia] are catastematic pleasures [hêdonai]; but khara and good cheer 
[euphrosunê] are regarded as kinetic activities." Khara, then, or joy (laetitia in Lucretius), which was 
one of the signs that the mind is located in the chest and hence must itself be an attribute of the rational 
part of the soul, differs from the mere exemption from fears, which is the natural and positive condition.  
If it is to be analogous to the unmixed pleasures (in Plato's phrase) that are found in pleasant sights and 
sounds and the like, then it is presumably a non-necessary pleasure, the absence of which is not 
associated with pain (or, to put it differently, it does not arise when some associated pain or distress is 
removed).  Since this joy is also the positive counterpart, we are told, of fear, it presumably also depends 
on belief, or at least on memory and anticipation, and also on calculation and whatever other mental 
activities exceed mere perception. This is just what we should expect of a function of the logikon part of 
the soul. I venture to suggest that reflection on past or future goods is among the things that cause this 
                                                                                                                                                                         
natural and necessary desires; cf. also Diano 1974: 170, who argues that static pleasure is produced when atoms 
return to their original (stable) position.  For a survey of modern views on the question, see Prost 2004: 119-24. 
25
 Cf. Cicero On Ends 2.6-7, which appears inconsistent with his statement that mobile pleasure resides in 
replenishment; see too Nikolsky p. 441, and O’Keefe 2010: 119-20, cited above. 
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kind of joy, as well as any other thoughts that are delightful and are not anticipations of the fulfillment 
of irrational (as opposed to non-rational) desires -- that is, desires that depend on empty opinion and are 
themselves a product of empty fears.26 Doubtless, the satisfactions of friendship, which was celebrated 
by the Epicureans, were an important source of such joy, among other reasons because friendship helps 
instill a sense of security against dangers that might threaten one's tranquility.27 As Epicurus puts it 
(Principal Doctrine 34): "we have use not so much for usefulness in our friends as for confidence in 
their usefulness." 
 There remains one further question on the nature of Epicurean pleasure: when we are 
experiencing the kinetic joy of the mind, is there also associated with it the physical pleasure of hêdonê 
that is experienced or perceived by the anima or non-rational part of the soul? And does the static 
enjoyment of ataraxy, when the mind is free from fear and anxiety, entail a kind of sensible pleasure as 
well? This is what Epicurus evidently says, when he affirms that "ataraxy and freedom from trouble are 
catastematic hêdonai." My guess is that we do best to take him at his word, and suppose that positive 
mental states, consisting in the absence of perturbation and the joy residing in pleasant thoughts, are also 
perceived as pleasures by the alogon part of the soul, which is the locus of aisthêsis or perception. No 
Epicurean ever claims that the atoms that constitute the non-rational part of the soul are excluded from 
that part of the chest in which the finer atoms constituting the rational part or animus are located, and it 
is entirely plausible that the animus intersects or overlaps with the anima. Although Lucretius makes it 
clear that not every distress or pain experienced in the mind or body necessarily entails a corresponding 
discomfort in the other part, he goes on to say that when the injury is great, then indeed there is such a 
consequential effect (Lucretius 3.152-60), since the mind and body are alike material and contiguous. I 
assume, then, that the pleasure deriving from ataraxy is genuine hêdonê, a pathos experienced in the 
alogon part of the soul. 
                                                 
26
 Giovacchini 2008: 70 suggests that the pleasure deriving from an awareness of one’s own security while 
observing the dangers to which others are exposed, as described by Lucretius in the proem to Book 2, is an 
instance of khara; for the nature of this pleasure, see Konstan 2008: 29-35. 
27
 The knowledge that we have friends would thus be the source of kinetic, not catastematic pleasure; contra 
Wheeler 2003: 184: "friendship -- while not strictly identical with happiness or the greatest good -- is identical 
with a kind of katastematic pleasure." Of course, insofar as having friends induces a sense of security and hence 
freedom from fear, it contributes to static pleasure, but is not identical to it. 
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 The combination of the pleasure deriving from a body free from pain and that of a soul free from 
distress, accompanied, it may be, by pleasant thoughts and sensations, constitutes the highest form and 
final end of human happiness. With it, we are equal to the gods: duration adds nothing to it, and the 
subsidiary kinetic pleasures do no more than work variations on the fundamental felicity of well-being.  
It is not a "neutral" state, as the opponents of Epicurus maintained, between pain and pleasure; it is the 
state in which all is working as it should, and the opposite of disrupted or distressed conditions of mind 
or body.28 It is not incompatible with a wide range of rational activities that differ from the simple 
pleasures, for example goal-oriented pursuits that enable us to procure the basic necessities of life or 
meet some other reasonable need or want; but such projects are not typically where pleasure is to be 
found. An exception is philosophy. Epicurus writes (Vatican Saying 27): "In the case of other activities 
their fruit [karpos] is accomplished with hardship, but with philosophy delight [to terpnon] runs hand in 
hand with knowledge [gnôsis]; for the benefit [apolausis] comes not after learning, but learning and 
benefit go together" (᾿Εpiὶ µὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐpiιτηδευµάτων µόλις τελειωθεῖσιν ὁ καρpiὸς ἔρχεται, ἐpiὶ δὲ 
φιλοσοφίας συντρέχει τῇ γνώσει τὸ τερpiνόν· οὐ γὰρ µετὰ µάθησιν ἀpiόλαυσις, ἀλλὰ ἅµα µάθησις καὶ 
ἀpiόλαυσις). Epicurus is not claiming here (as I mistakenly supposed in my book, p. 16 n. 24) that there 
are activities in which the pleasure resides in the achievement of a self-defined goal, rather than in the 
activity itself (philosophy being the exception); he is affirming rather that among the activities that we 
engage in for the sake of some benefit, philosophy is enjoyable even as we pursue the advantage we 
seek to obtain from it. I suppose that practicing the violin is also fun (or can be), even as one seeks to 
become proficient and achieve the benefit of being able to entertain others as well as one self with lovely 
music. But it is important to note that Epicurus does not locate happiness in the achievement of personal 
goals; hence a short life in which we may not succeed in realizing all our projects does not diminish 
human happiness, in Epicurus' view.29 
                                                 
28
 There is a certain resemblance between Epicurus’ view of the pleasure associated with the proper functioning or 
well-being of the body and Aristotle’s conception of pleasure as “the activity of the natural state” (ἐνέργειαν τῆς 
κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, Nicomachean Ethics 7.12, 1153a14); cf. Long and Sedley 1987 vol. 1: 123. 
29
 A number of modern scholars have faulted Epicurus for not taking such life projects into account; cf. in 
particular Nussbaum 1994: 204-22, Rosenbaum 1990, and Striker 1988, in response to Mitsis 1988; see also 
Mitsis 1996: 811-12: “if we think that death is robbing us of our future possibilities, we need to be careful not to 
simply appropriate for ourselves possibilities that are not really ours. For the Epicurean, our possibilities end 
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 In a way, this is all there is to say about Epicurean eudaimonia. All the rest of the teaching is 
designed to help people rid themselves of the irrational fears and attendant desires that assail the mind 
and are the cause of constant struggles for wealth and power that put even the elementary necessities of 
life at risk. Thus, the elaborate atomic theory inherited from Democritus and further developed by the 
school is intended to show that survival of the soul, or consciousness in any form after death, is 
impossible, and hence that the fear of suffering in the afterlife is ungrounded. Freeing the mind from 
such beliefs is not easy, because they have taken root as human society evolved for reasons that the 
Epicureans set forth as well. They thus worked out techniques for overcoming such inherited prejudices 
and fears, including collective study and mutual support in small groups or communities, pedagogical 
strategies (as outlined in the tract On Frank Speech by Philodemus), and memorization of useful 
precepts (hence the collection of Principal Doctrines, for example). But the ultimate aim of these 
methods and tenets was always to help people realize the crucial importance of bodily comfort and 
above all peace of mind as the be-all and end-all of human happiness, which can be achieved far more 
safely and with infinitely less peril and expenditure of energy than the things people typically strive for 
in ignorance of what their natures require. 
 Unlike other classical philosophical schools, such as that of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, for 
the Epicureans happiness or bliss (makariotês) and a life worthy of the gods was not by its nature 
something that only a very few enlightened souls could be expected to achieve. Epicurean eudaimonia 
was in principle available to anyone: it was a matter of obtaining a basic level of prosperity, which 
human social organization and technology have made possible for everyone (provided there is no civil 
strife and a vastly unequal distribution of wealth), and shedding received opinions that were little 
plausible in themselves (e.g., divine punishment in the afterlife). Of course, such ideas were acquired in 
childhood, when they could take root and become habitual; still, happiness was not a matter of acquiring 
transcendental wisdom but simply the state of mental and physical well-being that is the natural 
condition of human beings. Epicurean philosophy differs in this regard also from the right to the "pursuit 
of happiness" enshrined in the United States Declaration of Independence: happiness is not pursued, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                         
when we go out of existence.” For the apparently more nuanced position of Philodemus regarding death, see 
Armstrong 2004: 32-36, with substantial bibliography. 
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there for the taking, once one sees what it consists in and provided that one can satisfy the basic needs of 
the body (Epicurus sometimes speaks as though mental tranquility can override even the most severe 
pain, and affirms that the sage can be happy on the rack [Diogenes Laertius 10.118 = fr. 601 Usener], 
but I take this to be something of a polemical exaggeration, designed to emphasize the fact that the 
causes of human unhappiness are principally psychological rather than physical, at least among the 
classes to which the Epicureans addressed their writings).30 
 Epicurus' philosophy, moreover, is a kind of therapy, and is addressed principally to individuals, 
in the hope of correcting their mistaken ideas and thereby curing them of their personal, even if 
unacknowledged, disquiet.31 Correspondingly, the Epicureans had little interest in seeking political 
remedies for human misery; they recommended that people avoid engaging in politics, if possible, since 
it is an arena guaranteed to cause distress.32 Epicureans were prepared to offer advice to kings and other 
sovereigns, such as Roman governors and emperors, who dominated the world in which they lived, 
though individual cities had their own institutions that typically took the form of a limited democracy 
managed by and for the local aristocracy. They most certainly preferred to live under good monarchs 
rather than tyrants, who put their private interest above the welfare of their subjects (see, for example, 
Philodemus On the Good King according to Homer, addressed to Piso, the father-in-law of Julius 
Caesar, who was consul in 58 BC; Epicurus wrote a treatise, now lost, On Kingship).33 One will not 
find, however, among the writings of Epicurus the kind of utopian republics imagined by Plato or by 
Zeno and Chrysippus, or the model constitution envisaged by Aristotle in his Politics. 
                                                 
30
 Epicurus differed from the Cyrenaics also in holding that mental anguish was worse than physical pain 
(Diogenes Laertius 10.137), and perhaps went overboard in maintaining that a sage could achieve perfect 
contentment even in the presence of intense physical discomfort. To this end, Epicurus also argued that physical 
pains, when intense, are generally brief, and when lasting, moderate enough to be borne with tranquility. 
31
 On the medical image of philosophy as therapy, see Salem 1989: 9-21. 
32
 For the vicissitudes of the Epicurean advice to “live unnoticed,” see Roskam 2007a; also Roskam 2007b.  
Roskam argues that Epicurus’ aphorism was not intended as a blanket prohibition on any and all kinds of political 
activity, though it later came to be perceived as such. 
33
 For a good discussion of the political context and purpose of Philodemus' treatise, see Gigante 1995; see further 
De Sanctis 2008.  Gigante and Dorandi 1980 argue that Epicurus knew the treatise on kingship by Anaxarchus (a 
companion of Alexander the Great) and shared Anaxar
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 Nor did the Epicureans interest themselves, so far as one can tell, in collecting information about 
the "quality of life" of their contemporaries in the modern sense of the term.  Some years ago, I 
participated in a course called "The Quality of Life," which was taught jointly by members of four 
different disciplines at Brown University: Philosophy, Economics (alternating with Sociology), Public 
Health, and Classics (my own department). When introducing my own segment, I observed that what 
today is called "quality of life" would in classical antiquity have gone under the name of "the good life."  
The change in terminology is significant. "Quality of life" suggests something that can be measured and 
evaluated objectively; it evokes international initiatives to invest in the improvement of the lives of 
people who are impoverished and lack the resources, both material and organizational, to make progress.  
To be sure, "quality of life," as employed, for example, by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen in their 
co-edited volume, The Quality of Life (1993), differs from narrowly economic gauges of well-being such 
as income levels, which fail to take into account the absence of basic necessities such as schools or 
access to clean water, while at the same time they tend to overlook less material assets that may enhance 
life considerably, even in the absence of strictly financial prosperity. But such metrics of the quality of 
life, even if they include intangible elements, do not typically offer theories of happiness such as that of 
Epicurus and of other classical philosophers. In this respect, the Epicurean approach to eudaimonia may 
seem irrelevant to modern pragmatic projects to ameliorate the condition of mankind in general. 
 But Epicurus' conception of eudaimonia may nevertheless be useful to modern debates over 
happiness for the way it unites, in a materialist view of nature, physical and mental well-being, and 
understands happiness not as elation or even self-satisfaction, despite the focus on pleasure, but as the 
normal or healthy human condition. Once one has eliminated the pains and perturbations that afflict both 
body and mind, there is nothing left to strive for, though there is abundant joy, and this irrespective of 
duration. Pleasure is a state: it is not a hedonic ideal that aims at maximizing pleasure quantitatively, or a 
utilitarian calculus like Jeremy Bentham's "sum of pleasures and pains," even though the Epicureans 
were entirely in favor of sacrificing short-term pleasures at times for the sake of the longer term.  Thus, 
Epicurus writes in the Letter to Menoeceus (129): "every pleasure is a good because of the nature it has, 
but not every one is to be chosen, just as every pain is an evil, but not every pain is of such a nature as to 
be avoided." But he does not offer this strategy as a way of measuring contentment, but simply as a 
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means of securing the well-being of body and mind.  Finally, Epicurean eudaimonia is not reducible to 
positive thinking, or a question of attitude: it is not subjective in this sense. The idea that we simply are 
happy when we are not beset by pain and above all by anxiety (that is, groundless fears) might inject a 
dimension that is, I think, relatively rare in modern accounts.34 
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